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The increased use of online market places (like eBay) by professional traders and small 
businesses goes along with an increase in demand for online multi-unit auction designs. A 
seller with many objects for sale might consider it inconvenient to initiate and monitor a 
single auction for each individual item and thus might favour the use of a multi-unit auction.2 
However, the design of online multi-unit auctions can be substantially more difficult than that 
of single-unit auctions. In fact, the theoretical as well as empirical literature on multi-unit 
auctions is much less developed. New difficulties such as market power and computational 
complexities arise when objects are heterogeneous or bidders demand multiple items. In 
addition, there is a conflict between simplicity of auction rules and their efficiency (and 
revenue). If objects for sale are complements, to obtain the optimal performance (at least from 
a theoretical point of view) the auction design usually requires that bidders specify their 
preferences on any possible package of the N objects. Thus each bidder has to submit 2N-1 
numbers (as he might value any subset of the items for sale differently) . Especially for a large 
number of objects such an auction is often infeasible.3  
Multi-unit auction design is considerably simpler if one can assume that each bidder just 
demands one object (or, more generally, if objects are substitutes). As we will argue below, 
under this unit-demand assumption, the standard single-unit auction format used on eBay can 
be naturally extended to a multi-unit design.   
In what follows we will first describe the single-unit auction format used by eBay and then 
demonstrate how it can be adjusted to allow for the simultaneous sale of many objects. We 
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2 As long as bidders just demand one unit each and objects for sale are similar and auctioned in the right order, it 
should (under certain assumptions) not matter whether items are sold sequentially or simultaneously (see 
Kittsteiner et al. (2004) and references cited therein).  
 
3 It is not only infeasible because of the huge amount of information that needs to be transmitted but also because 
of the computational complexity involved in the determination of the allocation of the objects (see de Vries and 
Vohra (2003)). For a comprehensive overview on the most recent developments in combinatorial auction design 
refer to Milgrom (2004). 
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will discuss some of the drawbacks of this multi-unit design and offer another simple design 
that can circumvent some of these.  
Ebay’s single unit auction format essentially works as follows. The seller specifies a 
minimum bid which is a lower bound for all bids. Each bidder can then submit bids, each of 
which needs to be a specified increment above the highest standing bid. The highest standing 
bid is the highest of all previous bids and the minimum bid. After a pre-specified time the 
auction ends and the bidder with the highest bid wins the object and pays this bid to the seller. 
To facilitate incremental bidding in a way that does not require bidders to follow the entire 
bidding process, eBay offers bidders to submit their (maximum) bids to a proxy-agent. During 
the auction, this proxy-agent increases a bidder’s bid by the smallest amount necessary to 
become the highest bidder, as long as this bid is below or equal to the submitted maximum 
bid. That is, the proxy-agent bids incrementally on behalf of the bidder up to the maximum 
bid. Consequently, if one abstracts away a couple of frictions,4 the optimal strategy for a 
bidder is to tell the proxy-agent his willingness to pay, as he knows that, as a winner, he will 
usually not pay this price but a price equal to the second-highest maximum bid (plus at most 
an increment). 5   Note that this format resembles  the so called second-price or Vickrey  
auction (see Vickrey (1961)): each bidder submits a (sealed) bid. The highest bidder wins and 
pays a price equal to the second highest bid. 
This single-unit format can be modified to accommodate for the sale of many identical 
objects. Rather than putting one object for sale the seller has to announce how many objects 
he offers. As in the single-unit auction every bidder submits a (proxy) bid to the proxy-agent. 
Assume first that each bidder only desires one object and there are N objects offered for sale. 
Then the auction rules specify that the N highest bidders win one object each and pay a price 
that is an increment above the N+1'th highest (proxy) bid, i.e., the price is (almost) equal to 
the highest losing bid.  Note that it is important that the price is equal to the highest losing bid 
and not, e.g. equal to the lowest winning bid. If the latter was the case one of the winners (the 
bidder with the N′th highest bid) would determine the price. If bidders use the proxy (and do 
not bid incrementally) this price will be different from the N+1′th highest bid. Thus if the 
N+1th highest bid was known to a winning bidder during the bidding he would reduce the 
price by lowering his bid to an amount just above the highest losing bid. But because the 
highest losing bid is usually not known before the auction is over, it either needs to be 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of differences resulting from the dynamics and the minimum increment on eBay, see Roth and 
Ockenfels (2002) and Ockenfels and Roth (2006). We abstract from the issues mentioned there and note that 
they are equally relevant for the discussion of multi-unit auctions.  
5 This is the optimal strategy as explained and recommended on eBay’s  German help page.  
estimated by bidders if they want to submit the optimal proxy bid or bidders need to bid 
incrementally to avoid bidding (substantially) above the N+1th bid. In both cases bidding is 
more difficult and/or less convenient than in the single-unit format discussed above. The nice 
properties of the single-unit format only translate to the multi-unit format if the highest losing 
bid defines the price: then, as in the single-unit auction, it is optimal for a bidder to simply 
submit his willingness to pay to the proxy-agent. Arguments similar to these convinced eBay 
Germany to change their format away from one where the  price is determined by the lowest 
winning bid to one where it is the highest losing bid (plus an increment), see also Kittsteiner 
and Ockenfels (2006). 
To accommodate for the possibility that some buyers might want to purchase more than one 
object, online multi-unit auctions allow for bidders to indicate their desired quantity. A bid 
consists of a pair of two numbers: the amount requested and the willingness to pay (for one  
item).  However, in such a more general auction environment where at least one bidder 
demands more than one item, neither of the two multi-unit formats discussed above6 share the 
desired properties of the second-price auction in the single-object case (discussed above). The 
reason is that if a bidder demands more than one unit in eBay's multi-unit format, there is a 
positive probability that his bid is pivotal: he might only win some of the desired items. His 
bid determines the price (as it is the highest losing bid) but at the same time the bidder also 
pays this price as he wins a subset of his demanded items. Thus, similar to the case of unit 
demand where the price is given by the highest winning bid, the bidder will understate his 
willingness to pay, or (equivalently) reduce demanded quantities, hampering revenue and 
efficiency.7
Furthermore, efficiency cannot be expected in case of complementarities; that is, when the 
value of a bundle of objects is larger than the sum of values of each object separately. In such 
cases, a bidder may end up stuck with objects that are worth little because he failed to win all 
desired objects (exposure problem), and may quit early because of fear of this. As a result, 
inefficiencies are likely to arise in all auction formats, in which bidders cannot make sure that 
they purchase the desired number of objects. As already explained, avoiding the latter makes 
the auction design complicated to implement and difficult to understand for sellers and 
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7 Several field studies provide direct evidence of strategic demand reduction in electronic auction markets, such 
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and Lucking-Reiley (2000)). 
 
bidders. EBay resolved this trade-off between simplicity and efficiency/ flexibility in favour 
of simplicity. Their multi-unit format, from a theoretical point of view, appears adequate if 
bidders demand only one object each (which is probably the most common situation) and it 
can easily be understood by bidders who are already familiar with eBay’s single-unit auction 
design. EBay could address the exposure problem (that arises if bidders have multi-unit 
demand) by allowing bidders, who receive less objects than demanded, to withdraw the bid 
for all units. This solves the exposure problem but poses some difficult design questions. For 
instance, what is the price to be paid by the winners when, after the auction, a bid is 
withdrawn? If the withdrawn bid counts, the winner may rightly ask why he has to pay the 
higher price even though there is, after the withdrawal, no competition that justifies the higher 
price. If the withdrawn bid does not count bidders could collude to drive up prices to a pre-
emptive level and then finally withdraw the price defining bid such that the objects are sold 
for a very low price. Maybe because of these problems EBay decided not to allow for bid 
withdrawal.  
A more radical design for an online multi-unit auction could involve, for instance, a declining 
price: the price decreases from a high initial price and then declines by a predetermined 
decrement at predetermined times so that a bidder can indicate how many items he is willing 
to buy at the current price. The auction ends when all objects are sold (or when the auction 
runs out of time). As bidders who demand a certain amount of objects know at any time 
whether they will be able to win that bundle, one may expect bids (and revenue) to be higher 
than in eBay's multi-unit auction, where, due to the exposure problem, bidders might be 
reluctant to bid. Thus, such an approach is simple and avoids some of the problems of the 
multi-unit design discussed above. On the negative side, the declining price design represents 
a substantial departure from most existing single-unit online auction formats, where prices 
typically increase rather than decrease. Thus it might be less acceptable for bidders, who are 
reluctant to bid within a unfamiliar auction framework.  
We presented some ideas related to the design of multi-unit online auctions. We describe how 
simple existing single-unit formats can be and have been adjusted by online auction houses to 
accommodate for the sale of multiple units. Obviously, an optimal design will depend on 
many other important factors as well. As optimal auction and market design typically has to 
account for many specific details and conflicting objectives, a comprehensive analysis has to 
be beyond the scope of this article. A more comprehensive overview, where some of the ideas 
presented here are further amplified, can be found in Ockenfels et al. (forthcoming). 
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